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Non-technical summary:
Using a large linked employer-employee data set, this paper presents new evi-
dence on the collective bargaining wage effect in western and eastern Germany. The
novel feature of our analysis is that we use a longitudinal data set. Thus, in con-
trast to previous studies, we seek to assess the extent to which differences in wages
between workers in covered and uncovered firms really represent an effect of collec-
tive bargaining coverage, rather than a consequence of the non-random selection of
workers and firms into the different regimes. The fact that we observe employers to
change their contract status over time provides us with the opportunity to identify
the impact on individual wages by measuring the relative wage gains or losses of
workers employed in firms that change their contract status.
The results from a Pooled OLS specification indicate that differences in firm
characteristics account for the largest proportion of omitted variable bias. System-
atic sorting of observably better firms into the regimes appears to be more relevant
for industry contracts in western Germany and for firm-level contracts in eastern
Germany. The estimates from a fully interacted specification appear to support the
hypothesis that unions compress some of the returns to observable worker attributes.
However, the results from a fixed-effects specification show that a large part of this
flattening of the wage structure arises from a selectivity bias, as workers with low
levels of observable skills are positively and workers with higher levels of skills are
negatively selected into covered firms. Wage decompositions indicate that the over-
all effect of collective bargaining coverage on the returns to observable attributes
appears to be rather negligible once the selection into the regimes is accounted for.
Taken together, the fixed-effects specifications suggest the following conclusions.
First, differences in observables and unobservables appear to explain the full firm-
level contract wage premium in western Germany and the full premium associated
with industry-level contracts in eastern Germany. Second, there remains a small,
but statistically significant wage premium of about 2 per cent for industry-level
contracts in western Germany and a similar premium for firm-level contracts in
eastern Germany. The result that selection into industry-level contracts appears to
be somewhat more relevant in eastern Germany might be explained by the fact that
the decision of joining or leaving an employers’ association here is to a considerably
larger extent left to the firm’s discretion than in western Germany. In western
Germany, membership in an employers’ association is likely to be more exogenous,
since it presumably reflects to a larger extent the result of a historically grown
industrial relations structure.
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Abstract
Using a large linked employer-employee data set, this paper presents new
evidence on the collective bargaining wage effect in western and eastern Ger-
many. The novel feature of our analysis is that we use a longitudinal data
set. Thus, in contrast to previous studies, we seek to assess the extent to
which differences in wages between workers in covered and uncovered firms
really represent an effect of collective bargaining coverage, rather than a con-
sequence of the non-random selection of workers and firms into the different
regimes. By measuring the relative wage gains or losses of workers employed
in firms that change contract status, we obtain estimates that depart con-
siderably from previous results relying on cross-sectional data. Industry-level
contracts in western Germany and firm-level contracts in eastern Germany are
associated with a small, but statistically significant average wage premium of
about 2 per cent. Moreover, wage decompositions indicate that the overall
effect of collective bargaining coverage on the returns to observable attributes
appears to be negligible once the selection into the regimes is accounted for.
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1 Introduction
The question of whether unions are able to drive a wedge between the wages of
comparable workers in the union and non-union sector is of considerable interest to
an understanding of the wage determination process. While the empirical literature
for the U.S and the U.K. has primarily focused on union membership as a determi-
nant of individual wages (e.g. Blanchflower 1991, Card 1996, Andrews et al. 1998),
in continental Europe it is rather collective bargaining coverage that matters. The
reason is that extension mechanisms, which are widespread in European economies,
can widen the coverage of collective bargaining agreements irrespective of individual
workers’ union membership status. Given the differences in institutional settings in
which the bargaining may take place, a further question that has continued to mo-
tivate economic research is as to how firm-level contracts compare to industry-level
contracts.
There is a large theoretical literature on the link between the bargaining structure
and wages (Calmfors and Driffill 1988, Davidson 1988, Moene et al. 1993), whose
predictions have been tested in a number of cross-country studies (Calmfors and
Driffill 1988, Soskice 1990, OECD 1997, Calmfors 2001). More recently, with the
increasing availability of linked employer-employee data, the relationship between
collective bargaining coverage and wage outcomes has attracted renewed interest. By
providing both information on wages at the individual level and collective bargaining
coverage at the employers’ level, such data permit to exploit intra-national variations
in the bargaining structure to assess its impact on the level and structure of wages.
Examples include Hartog et al. (2002) for the Netherlands, Cardoso and Portugal
(2005) for Portugal, Stephan and Gerlach (2005) for Germany as well as Card and
de la Rica (2006) for Spain. While Hartog et al. (2002) fail to detect any positive
effect of bargaining coverage on wages, Stephan and Gerlach (2005) find industry
and firm-level contracts raise the overall level of wages, with the wage mark-up being
slightly larger under industry contracts. In contrast, the evidence by Cardoso and
Portugal (2005) and Card and de la Rica (2006) points to higher wage premiums
under firm-level contracts as compared to industry-level contracts.
Our paper presents new evidence on the collective bargaining wage effect, using
a large-scale German Linked Employer-Employee data set. Our analysis of collective
bargaining coverage and wages, which is the first comprehensive study for both west-
ern and eastern Germany, is motivated by several reasons. To begin with, and most
importantly, previous evidence on the collective bargaining effect relies on cross-
sectional data and typically fails to address the selection problem. As has already
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been argued in the literature on union wage effects (Card 1996, Lemieux 2000),
selection is likely to be a major issue, if collective bargaining contracts raise wages
above the competitive wage and compress the returns to observable attributes. In
this case, observed and unobserved productivity components are likely to be neg-
atively correlated since, e.g., workers with low observed skills will only be hired if
they exhibit high unobserved skills. In order to deal with such a potential selection
bias, the evidence presented in this paper is based on a longitudinal data set. Hence,
unlike the above cited studies, we seek to assess the extent to which differences in
wages between workers in covered and uncovered firms really represent an effect
of collective bargaining coverage, rather than a consequence of the non-random se-
lection of workers (and firms) upon time-invariant unobservables into the different
regimes. The fact that we observe employers to change their contract status over
time provides us with the opportunity to identify the impact on individual wages by
measuring the relative wage gains or losses of workers employed in firms that change
their contract status. Clearly, such an identification strategy rules out the endogene-
ity of a change in contract status, since establishments changing contract status may
experience different time-specific shocks than those that retain their contract status.
To assess the severity of this problem, we separately analyse transitions from one
regime to the other and compare the relative wage gain of individuals experiencing
a change in contract status to different reference groups.
Secondly, the German case provides an instructive example for continental Eu-
ropean extension mechanisms. Although negotiated wages apply strictly speaking
only to union members, firms generally extend wage settlements to non-member
employees as well. Moreover, central wage contracts may also apply to non-member
firms if an agreement is declared to be generally binding. As a consequence, despite
declining union membership among employees, which to date has reached a rela-
tively modest level of roughly 20 per cent, collective bargaining coverage is still of
crucial importance to the wage-setting process in Germany. For example, collective
bargaining contracts in 2004 were estimated to cover about 41 per cent of employers
and about 61 per cent of employees in western Germany (Addison et al. 2006).
A final, third, motivation is based on the fact that the institutional environ-
ment in Germany is characterised by the coexistence of different bargaining regimes.
Collective bargaining contracts may take the form of either firm-level contracts or
industry-level contracts. Moreover, in recent years wage determination without any
bargaining coverage has become more important. This is particularly relevant for
eastern Germany, where collective bargaining contracts are estimated to cover only
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19 per cent of employers in 2004 (Addison et al. 2006). Thus, with the increas-
ing importance of the uncovered sector it becomes not only possible to compare
wage outcomes under firm-level and industry-level contracts but also for workers in
covered and uncovered firms.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some institu-
tional background information on German wage determination. Section 3 contains
a theoretical discussion of how collective bargaining coverage may be expected to
affect the level and the structure of wages. Section 4 presents the empirical anal-
ysis. Section 4.1. sets out the identification strategy for estimating the impact of
collective bargaining on wage outcomes. While Section 4.2. provides a description
of the data set used, Section 4.3. presents the estimation results. The final Section
5 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
In this section we provide some background on how collective bargaining affects
German wage determination. Within the system of wage bargaining, regional and
industry-wide collective wage agreements (Fla¨chentarifvertra¨ge) rank among the
most important contract type. Such centralised wage contracts are negotiated be-
tween an industry-specific trade union and an employers’ association. While being
legally binding on all member firms of the employers’ association and on all em-
ployees who are members of the trade union, member firms generally extend the
wage settlement to the non-member labour force as well. The reason is that non-
member employees who would receive a lower wage may be expected to join the
union anyway in order to benefit from higher union wages. Moreover, central wage
contracts may also apply to non-member firms and their employees if an agreement
is declared to be generally binding by the Federal Ministry of Labour. Finally, there
are voluntary extension mechanisms, i.e. firms without any legally binding agree-
ment may voluntarily apply a central industry agreement. The predominance of
industry-level wage bargaining along with the synchronisation of different collective
agreements has led economists to characterise the German system of wage bargain-
ing as medium-centralised with a high degree of coordination (Calmfors and Driffill
1988, Soskice 1990, OECD 2004).
Even though industry-level bargaining may be still be viewed as the predom-
inant form of wage determination, in recent decades German industrial relations
have witnessed a clear tendency towards alternative forms of wage determination.
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Evidence from the IAB-Establishment Panel indicates that the proportion of es-
tablishments with a legally binding industry-wide contract fell economy-wide from
48 per cent to 44 per cent over the time period 1996 to 2002 in western Germany,
whereas the decline was from 28 per cent to 22 per cent in eastern Germany.1 This
phenomenon is largely the result of a considerable drop in membership rates of em-
ployers’ associations, with the decline being particularly pronounced among eastern
German firms.2 After German unification the western German system of collective
bargaining had been set up quite immediately by western unions in the East. The
decline in membership rates in eastern Germany then arose primarily from a rapid
wage convergence between western and eastern Germany which unions succeeded to
achieve following German unification (Hunt 2001).
Employers leaving their employers’ association either have the option of con-
cluding a firm-specific contract with their respective industry union or becoming
uncovered. However, at this point it is worthy to note that this decision is not
necessarily left to the employer’s discretion. For instance, even if a firm prefers to
stay uncovered, its union may attempt to enforce a firm-specific contract. Whether
such an attempt succeeds, ultimately depends on firm-specific union density. The
underlying notion is that the union’s ability to present the employer with a credible
threat to strike may be expected to increase considerably with the proportion of
workers who are organised in that union.3 Although the absolute number of firm-
specific collective wage agreements has increased markedly since the beginning of
the 1990s, this increase cannot explain the declining importance of industry-level
contracts. Evidence from the IAB-Establishment Panel indicates that the share of
establishments reporting the existence of a firm-level contract fell from 10.2 to 2.4
per cent in western Germany over the time period 1996 to 2002, and from 14.9
to 4.2 per cent in eastern Germany.4 Thus, the decline in industry-level coverage
rather resulted in an increasing share of uncovered establishments. In uncovered
firms wage determination may either take the form of individual wage contracts or
of plant-specific agreements (Betriebsvereinbarungen) between works councils and
1Own calculations based on IAB-Establishment Panel.
2For example, the employers’ association ”Gesamtmetall” reports that the share of employees
at member firms as a percentage of total employment in the metal and electrical industry fell in
West Germany from 77.4 per cent to 57.6 per cent over the time period 1984 to 2004, and in East
Germany from 66 per cent in 1991 to 18.1 per cent in 2004 (Gesamtmetall 2006).
3Indirect evidence for this is provided by Fitzenberger et al. (2006). Using a cross-section from
the German Salary and Wage Structure Survey the authors find the effect of firm-specific collective
bargaining coverage increase with the aggregate propensity of union membership.
4Own calculations based on IAB-Establishment Panel. It should be noted here that part of the
decline in firm-level coverage might have been caused by a change in the survey question concerning
firm-level contracts (see e.g. Schnabel et al. (2006)). See also Section 4.3.4. and Footnote 17.
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the management. Even though German legislation prohibits works councils from
negotiating about issues that are normally dealt with in collective agreements, they
are widely recognised to play a crucial role in wage determination (see e.g. Hassel
1999, Hu¨bler and Jirjahn 2003). Particularly in those uncovered firms who infor-
mally follow the terms of a central industry agreement, works councils are likely to
be involved in the implementation of voluntarily applied contract terms.
Summing up, the coexistence of different bargaining regimes in Germany provides
an environment that is suitable for estimating (1) how industry-level and firm-level
coverage affects wages relative to no-coverage and (2) for assessing the relative effect
of firm-level versus industry-level contracts.
3 Theoretical Considerations
In an institutional environment, such as the German one, the effect of collective bar-
gaining coverage on the level of wages is a-priori ambiguous. Standard bargaining
theory generally predicts covered firms to pay higher wages relative to uncovered
firms (e.g. Oswald 1982). The underlying notion is that unions may be expected
to have greater bargaining power than works councils or individual workers in un-
covered firms. A further explanation for why collective bargaining coverage might
lead to higher wage outcomes relates to the relatively centralised union structure
in Germany. In their seminal paper, Calmfors and Driffill (1988) argue that with
more centralised wage bargaining unions are able to secure higher wages, since they
internalise positive externalities arising from demand spill-over effects across firms
(or industries) producing substitutable goods. However, the authors also note that
with more centralised bargaining unions progressively take into account negative
externalities since the impact of the negotiated wage on the general consumption
price-level becomes larger as centralisation increases. These two countervailing ef-
fects give rise to the well-known ”hump-shaped” relationship between wages and the
degree of bargaining centralisation. The question of whether collective bargaining
coverage produces higher wage outcomes relative to uncovered firms therefore de-
pends crucially on the relative extent to which positive and negative externalities
are internalised by German industry unions. It is important to note that the inter-
nalisation of externalities may also be relevant under firm-specific contracts, because
such contracts are typically concluded by industry unions.
Collective bargaining is not only believed to affect the level but also the struc-
ture of wages. There is widespread evidence that collective wage contracts appear
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to standardise wages across firms and across skill groups (see e.g. Cardoso and
Portugal 2005, Stephan and Gerlach 2005). A frequently invoked theoretical ex-
planation refers to the insurance motive, which asserts that unions may favour a
compressed wage structure due to workers’ demand for income insurance (e.g. Agell
and Lommerud 1992, Burda 1995). The fact that collective contracts may affect
the returns to observed attributes has important consequences for the selection of
workers and firms into bargaining coverage. If, for example, collective contracts
compress the returns to observed skills, jobs in covered firms are particularly de-
sirable for those workers with low observed skills and less attractive for those with
high observed skills. A simple queuing model then predicts employers to hire the
most productive workers from those with low observed skills. Workers with high
observed skills, in contrast, should be negatively selected as a job in a covered firm
will be desirable only for those with low unobserved skills (see Farber 1983, Card
1996, Lemieux 2000). It should be noted here that the term ”unobserved” refers to
worker skills that are observable to employers, but not observed by the researcher.
As a result, taking into account the selection upon unobservables should reduce a
potential wage premium among low-skilled workers to a larger extent than among
high-skilled workers.
A similar selection process may take place with respect to employers’ charac-
teristics. For Germany, recent evidence suggests that collective wage agreements
appear to suppress firm wage differentials arising from different profitability condi-
tions (Guertzgen 2005). Given that such contracts shelter firms against excessive
rent-sharing at the firm-level, the selection into collective bargaining coverage is
thus particularly desirable for highly profitable firms. As firm-specific profitability
is likely to be correlated with other unobservable firm characteristics associated with
higher wages, accounting for such a selection process would also lead to a decline in a
potential contract wage premium. Selection of better firms into bargaining coverage
may not only occur on the employer’s, but also on the union’s side. For the U.S.,
DiNardo and Lee (2004) argue that one potential source of selectivity bias may be
based on the fact that unions may find it particularly profitable to organise at highly
successful firms. The same phenomenon may occur in an institutional setting, such
as the German one, where unions may enforce firm-level agreements with employers
not being members of an employers’ association. As long as unions find it beneficial
to enforce such contracts at systematically better firms, this may also give rise to a
potential selectivity bias.
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4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Estimation Strategy
To quantify the collective bargaining wage premiums, we consider a wage equation
taking the following form:
lnwit = µ+ γC · Cjt + γF · Fjt + β · x′it + δ · u′i + η · w′jt + ρ · q′j + νijt (1)
where the error component may be written as
νijt = αi + φj + ²ijt. (2)
There are i = 1,..., N individuals, and N∗ =
∑
Ti total worker-year observations.
Since we will use matched worker-establishment data, j refers to the establishment
which employs individual i at time t, i.e. we have strictly speaking j = j(i, t),
with j = 1, ..., J. The dependent variable, lnwit, is the individual log daily wage.
The explanatory variables of main interest are Cjt and Fjt, which are indicator vari-
ables taking on the value of unity if the establishment that employs individual i at
time t is subject to a centralised industry-level or a firm-level contract. x′it represents
a vector of time-varying individual covariates with a coefficient vector β, while u′i
denotes a vector of individual time-constant characteristics with a coefficient vector
δ. Similarly, w′jt and q
′
j represent time-varying and time-constant j−level covariates
with coefficient vectors η and ρ. Time dummies are included to capture common
macroeconomic effects. Finally, in eq. (2) the unobserved component comprises an
individual unobserved effect, αi, establishment-specific unobserved heterogeneity,
φj, and a time-specific error term, ²ijt.
In our estimation strategy, we first focus on a simple pooled Ordinary Least
Squares (POLS) specification of eq. (1), in which neither αi nor φj are controlled
for. The POLS estimations serve as a benchmark case and will be modified in
various respects: First, to assess the impact of collective bargaining coverage on
the overall wage structure, we will estimate a fully interacted model, which includes
interaction terms of all covariates with the contract status dummies. The interacted
regressors are expressed in terms of deviations from their sample means, allowing
us to interpret the estimated coefficient on firm-level and centralised contracts as
the wage premium for a worker with the average characteristics of the full sample.
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Hence, eq. (1) changes to:
lnwit = µ+ γC · Cjt + γF · Fjt + β · x′it + η · w′jt + δ · u′i + ρ · q′j
βC · Cjt · (x′it − x) + δC · Cjt · (u′i − u)+
ηC · Cjt · (w′jt − w) + ρC · Cjt · (q′j − q)+
βF · Fjt · (x′it − x) + δF · Fjt · (u′i − u)+
ηF · Fjt · (w′jt − w) + ρF · Fjt · (q′j − q) + αi + φj + ²ijt
Second, to assess the extent to which sorting based upon unobservable charac-
teristics of workers and firms affects our estimates, we will present estimates of a
fixed-effects specification which eliminates αi as well as φj. To remove αi+φj, we first-
difference eq. (1) within each individual-establishment combination, also referred to
as individual-establishment-’spells’ (Andrews et al. 2005). Defining θs = αi + φj in
eq. (1) as the unobserved spell-level effect for spell s, first-differencing of eq. (1)
yields:
∆ lnwit = γC ·∆Cjt + γF ·∆Fjt + β ·∆x′it + η ·∆w′jt +∆²ijt, (3)
where first-differencing within each spell sweeps out θs. Thus, the coefficients
on ∆Cjt and ∆Fjt will yield a consistent estimator of the wage premiums as long
as ∆Cjt and ∆Fjt are uncorrelated with ∆²ijt. Correspondingly, the interacted
specification reads as
∆ lnwit = γC ·∆Cjt + γF ·∆Fjt + β ·∆x′it + η ·∆w′jt+
βC · (Cjt(x′it − x)− Cjt−1(x′it−1 − x)) + δC ·∆Cjt(u′i − u)+
ηC · (Cjt(w′jt − w)− Cjt−1(w′jt−1 − w)) + ρC ·∆Cjt(q′j − q)+
βF · (Fjt(x′it − x)− Fjt−1(x′it−1 − x)) + δF ·∆Fjt(u′i − u)+
ηF · (Fjt(w′jt − w)− Fjt−1(w′jt−1 − w)) + ρF ·∆Fjt(q′j − q) + ∆²ijt.
From eq. (3) it becomes clear that spell first-differencing eliminates time-constant
individual characteristics u′i as well as time-constant establishment variables q
′
j, so
that the coefficient vectors δ and ρ cannot be identified. Only the interaction coef-
ficients δr, ρr , r = C,F, are identified from variations in contract status, i.e. unless
∆Cjt 6= 0 and ∆Fjt 6= 0. For this reason, it is common to subsume observable time-
constant and unobservable attributes into one single individual- and establishment
effect, i.e. ϕi = δ · ui + αi as well as ϑj = ρ · qj + φj.
Finally, eq. (3) clarifies that our identification strategy relies on the assumption
that a change in contract status is uncorrelated with time-specific unobservables.
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This assumption rules out, for example, that establishments changing contract sta-
tus experience different time-specific shocks than those that retain their contract
status. Clearly, it is easy to imagine situations in which this assumption will be
violated. On the employer’s side, for example, leaving collective bargaining might
be systematically correlated with negative shocks. On the union’s side, however,
enforcing a firm-level contract might be correlated with positive shocks if unions
are more likely to do so in better times. In such a case, identification of the con-
tract wage premium requires instrumental variables that affect contract status but
not wages. Unfortunately, it is hard to think of any variables satisfying these re-
quirements. However, we attempt to assess the severity and direction of a potential
endogeneity bias. To do so, we separately analyse transitions from one regime to the
other and subsequently compare the wage gain of individuals experiencing a change
in contract status to the wage gain of two different comparison groups. The first
one comprises those individuals that stay in the origin regime, while the second one
consists of those always being covered by the destination regime. As far as differ-
ences in unobservables are likely to be correlated with differences in observables, a
comparison of observable characteristics of switching plants and those in the respec-
tive comparison groups then may give us some further indication about a direction
of a potential endogeneity bias.
4.2 Data and Variable Description
In the empirical analysis we use data from the IAB Linked Employer-Employee panel
(LIAB) which combines data from the IAB-Establishment Panel and the Employ-
ment Statistics Register. The IAB-Establishment Panel is based on an annual survey
of establishments in western Germany administered since 1993 by the research insti-
tute of the Federal Employment Services in Nuremberg. Establishments in eastern
Germany entered the panel in 1996. The database is a representative sample of
German establishments employing at least one employee who pays social security
contributions. The survey collects numerous information on establishment struc-
ture and performance, as e.g. sales, the share of materials in sales and investment
expenditures (see e.g. Bellmann et al. 2002). Most importantly, establishments are
asked to report whether they are bound to an industry-wide collective wage agree-
ment or, alternatively, to a firm-specific wage agreement. Moreover, since 1999 those
establishments without any binding collective contract are asked whether they fol-
low informally the terms of an industry-wide agreement. However, for the available
waves respondents are not asked to provide any information on the precise nature
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of the voluntarily applied contract terms. As a result, the informational content of
this question remains rather elusive. Throughout the following analysis, collective
bargaining status therefore refers to the existence of a legally binding agreement,
i.e. establishments informally following the terms of an industry agreement will be
treated as being uncovered. As a consequence, our estimated wage premiums need
to be interpreted as wage mark-ups associated with a legally binding collective wage
agreement.
The worker information comes from the Employment Statistics Register, which is
an administrative panel data set of all employees paying social security contributions
(see e.g. Bender et al. 2000). The data are based on notifications which employers
are obliged to provide for each employee covered by the German social security sys-
tem. Those notifications are required whenever an employment relationship begins
or ends. In addition, there is at least one annual compulsory notification for all
employees who are employed on the 31st December of each year. Due to its admin-
istrative nature, this database has the advantage of providing reliable information
on daily earnings that are subject to social security contributions. The establish-
ment and worker data sets contain a unique establishment identification number.
This allows us to match information on all employees covered by the social security
system with the establishments in the IAB-Establishment Panel.
The construction of the Linked Employer-Employee data set occurs in two steps:
First, we select establishments from the establishment panel data set. From the
available waves 1993 to 2002, we use the years 1995 to 2002, since detailed informa-
tion on bargaining coverage is available only from 1995 onwards. Since information
on a number of variables, as e.g. investment expenditures and sales are gathered
retrospectively for the preceding year, we lose information on the last year. More-
over, we restrict our sample to establishments from the mining and manufacturing
sector with at least two employees. We focus on these sectors for two reasons: First,
unions are generally believed to be particularly strong in this part of the economy
(Hassel 1999, Addison et al. 2006) and second, former studies have already estab-
lished significant wage premiums associated with collective bargaining contracts in
these sectors (Stephan and Gerlach 2005). In order to be able to conduct first-
differencing, only establishments with consistent information on the variables of
interest (described below) and at least two consecutive time series observations are
included in our sample. To avoid measuring spurious changes in contract status,
we exclude from the remaining establishments (2,156) those that change their col-
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lective bargaining status more than once in the time-period under consideration.5
This results in a sample of 2,014 establishments with 6,086 observations, yielding
an unbalanced panel containing establishment observations with, on average, 3.02
years of data.
In the second step, we merge the establishment data with notifications for all
employees who are employed by the selected establishments on June 30th of each
year. From the worker data we drop observations for apprentices, part-time workers
and homeworkers.6 To avoid modeling human capital formation and retirement de-
cisions, we exclude individuals younger than 19 and older than 55. Moreover, since
we consider only full-time workers, we eliminate those whose wage falls short of
some threshold level.7 Again, we consider only those individuals for whom at least
two consecutive time series observations are available. The final sample comprises
512,507 individuals in 1,909 establishments, yielding an unbalanced panel contain-
ing 1,752,212 individual observations with, on average, 3.42 years of data for each
worker.8
The individual data include information on the gross daily wage, age, gender, na-
tionality, employment status (blue/white-collar), educational status (six categories)9
and on the date of entry into the establishment. The latter is used to approximate
tenure by subtracting the entry date from the ending date of the employer’s noti-
fication which is available from the worker data. Note, however, that this proxy
does not account for potential employment interruptions which might have occurred
during this time span.
The dependent variable in the subsequent analysis is the real gross daily wage.
The wage is reported inclusive of fringe-benefits as long as such wage supplements
are subject to social security contributions. Since there is an upper contribution
limit to the social security system, gross daily wages are top-coded. In our sam-
ple, top-coding affects 12.5 per cent of all observations. To address this problem,
5142 establishments out of 463 establishments that exhibit a variation in contract status change
their bargaining status more than once.
6Part-time workers are excluded because the Employment Statistics Register lacks explicit in-
formation on hours worked.
7The threshold level is defined as the twice amount of the lower social security contribution
limit.
8Note that the exclusion of certain individual groups entails a loss of 105 establishments.
9The categories are: No degree, vocational training degree, highschool degree (Abitur), high-
school degree and vocational training, technical college degree and university degree. Missing
and inconsistent data on education are corrected according to the imputation procedure described
in Fitzenberger et al. (2005). This procedure relies, roughly speaking, on the assumption that
individuals cannot lose their educational degrees.
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we construct 42 cells based on education, gender and year. For each cell, a tobit
regression is estimated with log daily wages as the dependent variable and individ-
ual and establishment covariates as explanatory variables (see Table 1 below). As
described in Gartner (2005), right-censored observations are replaced by wages ran-
domly drawn from a truncated normal distribution whose moments are constructed
by the predicted values from the Tobit regressions and whose (lower) truncation
point is given by the contribution limit to the social security system. After this
imputation procedure, nominal wages are deflated by the Consumer Price Index of
the Federal Statistical Office Germany normalised to 1 in 2000. Turning to the es-
tablishment variables, we control for establishment size, per-capita quasi-rents, the
capital-labour ratio, the existence of a works council as well as industry-specific and
firm-specific collective bargaining coverage. Table A1 in the appendix provides a
more detailed description of the construction of the establishment variables.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the subsequent anal-
ysis. The first two columns report statistics averaged over individuals, whereas the
last two columns present statistics that are averaged over establishments. Due to the
underlying distribution of establishment size, both statistics partly differ substan-
tially from each other. Because larger establishments pay on average higher wages
and are more profitable in terms of per-capita quasi-rents, the underlying sample
means are lower on the establishment level. Moreover, there are also considerable
differences with respect to collective bargaining coverage. Large establishments are
much more likely to be covered by an industry-wide agreement, whereas small estab-
lishments are more likely to belong to the non-union sector, which is line with what
has been found earlier in the literature (e.g. Schnabel et al. 2006). As a result, the
majority of individuals (84 per cent) are employed by an establishment that adopts
an industry-wide agreement. The fraction of individuals covered by a firm-specific
agreement amounts to 10 per cent. Finally, only 6 per cent of all individuals are
subject to no agreement at all, even though the fraction of uncovered establishments
amounts to about 38 per cent.
The left panel of Table A2 in the appendix reports sample statistics for individu-
als subject to an industry-level contract, a firm-level contract and for those without
any bargaining coverage for the western German sample. The corresponding statis-
tics for the eastern German sample are presented in the right panel of Table A2.
In the western German sample, firm-level contracts are associated with the largest
raw wage differential and the lowest variability in wages. The sample means for the
establishment variables reveal that workers subject to firm-level agreements are, on
12
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Definition Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev.
Individual level Establishm. level
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
LOG WAGE Log real daily wage in DM 5.23 0.33 4.92 0.34
FEMALE Female worker 0.19 0.25
AGE Age in years 39.18 8.83 39.01 3.94
TENURE Tenure in months 130.85 86.74 94.96 49.04
FOREIGN Foreign worker 0.10 0.05
WHITECOLL White-collar worker 0.37 0.32
VOCATIO Vocational degree 0.68 0.77
HIGHSCHOOL Highschool degree 4.9e−03 3.2e−03
VOC-HIGH Voc. and Highschool degree 0.03 0.03
TECHN-UNI Technical Univ. degree 0.06 0.04
UNI University degree 0.06 0.04
ESTABLISHMENT CHARACTERISTICS
QUASI-RENT Per-capita quasi-rent 1.12 0.90 0.63 0.83
SIZE Establishment size 5,229.50 10,368.76 380.45 1,465.38
CENT Industry-level contract 0.84 0.53
FIRM Firm-level contract 0.10 0.09
WCOUNCIL Works council 0.96 0.54
K/L Capital-labour ratio 1.78 3.50 1.75 8.18
EAST Eastern Germany 0.15 0.45
Individuals 512,507
Establishments 1,909
Source: LIAB 1995-2002.
Note: 1,909 establishments, 512,507 individuals, 1,752,212 observations. Per-capita quasi-
rents and the capital-labour ratio are measured in 100,000 DM. 1 e corresponds to 1.95583 DM.
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average, employed by more capital-intensive and more profitable firms, followed by
those covered by an industry-wide agreement. As to the individual characteristics,
workers under firm- or industry-specific contracts are, on average, more likely to
be male, are less likely to have no educational degree and have more months of
(potential) tenure relative to uncovered individuals. Finally, uncovered individuals
are more likely to be white-collar workers. A somewhat different pattern is found
for the eastern German sample. Here, the largest raw wage differential and the
lowest variability in wages emerges under centralised contracts. Table A2 shows
that workers under centralised agreements are, on average, employed by larger and
more profitable firms, followed by those subject to a firm-level agreement. Finally,
workers under centralised contracts are more likely to be male, white-collar, and
have more months of potential tenure relative to uncovered individuals and those
subject to firm contracts. As a result, for both the western and eastern German
sample, most of the differences in observed establishment and individual character-
istics would generally predict higher wages for workers in covered establishments,
which clearly requires a multivariate estimation strategy.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Pooled OLS Results
The left panel of Table 2 reports the results from the pooled OLS (POLS) regression
using the western German sample. Model (1) indicates that the raw wage differential
amounts to 16 per cent under industry contracts and to 20.6 per cent under firm-
level contracts. Adding individual characteristics increases the explanatory power
of the model considerably and reduces the coefficients to 0.116 and 0.155, suggesting
that about one quarter of the correlation between collective bargaining coverage and
wages is due to systematic sorting of workers across firms (Model (2)). Including
establishment characteristics, such as establishment size, the capital-labour ratio,
per-capita quasi-rents and the existence of a works council leads to a further sub-
stantial decrease in the coefficients and renders them insignificant. The estimated
wage premium of industry contracts decreases by 80 per cent, while the mark-up of
firm-level contracts drops by 70 per cent.
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All establishment covariates enter the specification with their expected sign and
are all significant at conventional levels (Model (3)). Establishment size, per-capita
quasi-rents and the capital-labour ratio are found to have a significant positive ef-
fect on wages, a result which is consistent with what has been found earlier in the
literature.10 To control for cross-state differences in wages, Model (4) includes re-
gional dummies for 10 western German federal states. Controlling for establishment
location leads to a larger and somewhat more precise estimate of the collective bar-
gaining coefficients, indicating that bargaining coverage is particularly concentrated
among states characterised by less favourable economic conditions. In Model (5),
the inclusion of industry and time dummies leads to a further increase in the col-
lective bargaining coefficients. This reflects the underlying industry distribution
of collective contracts, which are relatively more frequent among low-wage sectors,
such as the consumer-goods industries. From Model (1) to (5), the coefficient on
industry contracts drops by about 70 per cent, while the coefficient on firm contracts
decreases by about 65 per cent.
The right panel of Table 2 reports the POLS regression results using the east-
ern German sample. Including individual characteristics in Model (2) reduces the
coefficient on centralised contracts from 0.315 to 0.230 and on firm-level contracts
from 0.185 to 0.133, indicating that individual observables account for a similar
proportion of omitted variable bias as in the western German sample. From Model
(1) to (5), the coefficient on industry contracts drops by about 60 per cent, while
the coefficient on firm contracts decreases by 70 per cent. Overall, the results from
Table 2 imply that observable establishment characteristics generally account for the
largest proportion of omitted variable bias in the raw wage differentials. Systematic
sorting of observably better firms into the regimes appears to be more relevant for
industry-level contracts in western Germany and for firm-level contracts in eastern
Germany.
As mentioned earlier, much of the empirical research on union wage effects sug-
gests that unions do not only affect the mean but also the overall dispersion of
wages through their impact on the returns to worker and firm attributes. To assess
the impact of collective bargaining coverage on the overall wage structure, Table 3
reports the estimates of a fully interacted model, which includes interaction terms
of all covariates with the contract status dummies.
10For firm size effects see e.g. Oi and Idson (1999), German evidence on employer size effects
is provided by Schmidt and Zimmermann (1991). Hildreth and Oswald (1997) and Arai (2003)
present international evidence on the wage-profit relationship, while evidence for Germany is doc-
umented in Ko¨nig and Hu¨bler (1998) and Guertzgen (2005).
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Recall that the interacted regressors are expressed in terms of deviations from
their sample means, so that the estimated coefficient on firm-level and centralised
contracts is to be interpreted as the wage premium for a worker with the average
characteristics of the sample. The average wage premiums for centralised and firm-
level contracts are presented in the first row of columns (2) and (3), the interaction
effects of individual and establishment level observables are shown below. Groupwise
F -tests testing the joint significance of the interaction coefficients for industry and
firm-level contracts reject the null-hypothesis of the equality of all the coefficients
across the three regimes (with P -values close to zero). The results indicate that the
estimated returns to most of the individual attributes such as gender, employment
status, potential tenure and a vocational-plus-highschool qualification are smaller for
covered individuals, which appears to support the view that collective bargaining
contracts reduce skill and gender wage differentials. This pattern of results is similar
to what has been found in the international literature and confirms recent findings
by Stephan and Gerlach (2005) for Germany. Note, however, that the estimates do
not reveal any clear pattern of the extent of wage compression under both contract
types. While industry-level contracts appear to decrease the returns to tenure and to
a vocational-plus-highschool degree to a larger extent than firm-level contracts, the
reverse is true for the gender wage penalty and the returns to employment status.
As to the returns to establishment attributes, the estimated coefficients on per-
capita quasi-rents reveal that collective contracts appear to decrease the returns
to establishment profitability, which has already been documented in earlier work
(Guertzgen 2005). Finally, the results indicate that workers in covered establish-
ments benefit the most from the existence of a works council. A possible expla-
nation for this finding may relate to the fact that in covered establishments union
density among works councils members is generally very high (Hassel 1999). To
the extent that works councils in uncovered establishments are characterised by a
fragmentation of interests, this may help to increase the local bargaining power of
works councils in covered establishments. In sum, the estimated average wage pre-
mium is 0.081 for industry-level contracts and 0.119 for firm-level contracts, with
both premiums being significant at the 1%-level. These estimates are in a similar
range compared with those obtained by Stephan and Gerlach (2005), who report
coefficients between 0.088 and 0.114 on industry contracts and between 0.072 and
0.104 on firm contracts for 1995 and 2001.11
11Note, however, that the authors use a different data set (the Salary and Wage Structure
Survey from the West German Federal State of Lower-Saxony) and employ a different set of
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The right panel of Table 3 presents the results from the fully interacted specifi-
cation using the eastern German sample. Inspection of the interaction coefficients
reveals that, similar to the western German estimates, the estimated returns to em-
ployment status and the gender wage penalty are smaller for covered individuals.
Note, however, that unlike in the western German sample especially industry-level
contracts do not appear to exert any influence on the returns to skills. A further
difference that emerges is that the interaction effect for works councils is found to
be significant only under industry-level contracts, with the effect being much more
pronounced than in establishments in western Germany (0.137 versus 0.056). Also
noteworthy is the result that collective contracts are found to compress the returns
to establishment size which distinguishes them further from their western German
counterparts. As a result, the estimated average wage premium is 0.068 for industry-
level contracts and significant at the 1%-level, while the point estimate for firm-level
contracts is found to be very small (0.009) and not significantly different from zero.
4.3.2 Individual and Establishment Heterogeneity
Our earlier considerations from Section 3 suggested that the estimated wage ef-
fects might be biased due to a non-random selection of workers with unobservable
skills and firms with unobservable attributes into the different regimes. To assess
the extent to which sorting affects our estimates, we next attempt to control for
individual- and establishment-specific unobservables by estimating a spell differ-
enced specification. Note that the extent to which spell fixed-effects estimates differ
from individual fixed-effects estimates largely depends on the fraction of individuals
who move between establishments within our sample. In the extreme case of no
turnover between sample establishments, spell and individual fixed-effects yield the
same results, and αi and φj cannot be separately identified. A closer examination
of the distribution of the number of spells reveals that the majority of individuals
do not move between sample establishments, only 827 out of 438,183 workers in
the western German sample and 130 out of 74,368 workers in the eastern German
sample (corresponding to 0.19 per cent in the western German and 0.17 per cent
in the eastern German sample) move from one sample establishment to another.12
covariates. Further evidence based upon the Salary and Wage Structure Survey is provided by
Heinbach (2005) and Fitzenberger et al. (2006). However, their results are not directly comparable
to ours since Heinbach distinguishes industry-level contracts with and without opt-out clauses,
while Fitzenberger et al. consider the impact of firm-specific shares of covered employees on wage
outcomes.
12Note that the number of West German individuals (438,183) plus the number of East German
individuals (74,368) exceeds the total number of individuals in our analysis (512,507), since 22
individuals move between East and West Germany.
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Moreover, out of 503 establishments with sample movers, the majority (398) employ
less than 5 movers (out of which 249 have only one single mover). As a consequence,
we do not separately identify αi and φj as proposed by Abowd et al. (1999), since
for a large number of firms such an identification would have to rely on a very few
number of movers to estimate the establishment effect.13
From eq. (3) it becomes evident that with the spell differenced specification
the wage premiums associated with firm and industry-level contracts are identified
solely from within-establishment variation in contract status. To gain an idea of the
underlying dynamics with respect to collective bargaining status, Table 4 reports
the number of observed transitions between the three regimes.14
Table 4: Changes in contract status
Transitions Western German Sample
from to: Industry-level Firm-level No-coverage
Industry-level 688 15 29 732 (69.8%)
Firm-level 21 58 16 95 (9.1%)
No-coverage 40 9 172 221 (21.1%)
749 (71.5%) 82 (7.8%) 217 (20.7%) 1,048
Transitions Eastern German Sample
from to: Industry-level Firm-level No-coverage
Industry-level 224 13 46 283 (32.9%)
Firm-level 15 44 42 101 (11.7%)
No-coverage 31 24 422 477 (55.4%)
270 (31.4%) 81 (9.4%) 510 (59.2%) 861
Source: LIAB 1995-2002. The figures refer to the number of establishments.
Closer inspection of the off-diagonal entries in the upper panel of Table 4 shows
that in the western German sample 130 out of 1,048 establishments changed contract
status in the time period under consideration, with the biggest movement taking
place between no-coverage and industry-level contracts. The lower panel of Table 4
shows that establishments in eastern Germany exhibit stronger variation in contract
status, with 171 out of 861 establishments changing contract status between 1996
and 2002.
13The low proportion of movers is due to the fact that the linked Employer-Employee data set is
based on a sample of establishments. As a result, the probability of observing workers moving from
one sample establishment to another is very low. It is important to note that the low proportion
of movers does not imply that our data set is restricted to very stable employment relationships
as workers (and firms) may enter and exit the panel.
14The number of individuals affected by each transition are reported in Table 7.
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In addition, the figures indicate that in the western German sample the number
of establishments becoming uncovered (45 ”quitters”) is roughly matched by the
number of establishments becoming covered (49 ”joiners”). On the contrary, in
the eastern German sample the number of quitting establishments (88) is found to
exceed that of joining establishments (55) by about 60 per cent.
The left panel of Table 5 reports the spell differenced estimates using the western
German sample. Since differencing requires at least two consecutive time periods
within each spell, we need to exclude 830 spells with only one observation per spell
and the number of observations drops to 1,067,633.15 The average wage premiums
for centralised and firm-level contracts are presented in the first row of columns (2)
and (3), the interaction effects of individual and establishment level observables are
shown below. The results from the spell differenced regressions imply a wage mark-
up of about 0.02 under industry-level contracts, which is statistically significant at
the 5%-level. These results imply that for a worker with the average characteristics
of the sample the wage premium under centralised contrast decreases by about 75
per cent once the non-random selection of workers and firms into the bargaining
regimes is accounted for. By contrast, the wage premium under firm-level contracts
is estimated to be negative and not significantly different from zero, indicating that a
positive selection is even more relevant under firm-level contracts. Closer inspection
of the interaction effects in Table 5 reveals that compared with the POLS specifica-
tion the estimated returns to most of the individual attributes are not significantly
smaller for covered individuals (with the exception of the wage penalty for foreign
workers which is significantly larger under firm-level contracts). Note that this pat-
tern of results is consistent with the notion that the flattening of the wage structure
that emerged from the simple POLS specification arises from a selectivity bias, since
workers with low levels of observed skills tend to be positively selected and workers
with higher levels of observed skills tend to be negatively selected into covered firms.
To highlight this selection process, it may be instructive to compare the industry-
level wage premium among workers without any degree to the premium among
workers with a vocational-plus-highschool degree. For the latter, the wage premium
resulting from the interacted POLS specification is 0.038 and decreases to 0.015 in
the spell differenced specification. By comparison, for a worker without any degree
the interacted POLS specification implies a wage premium of 0.092, which drops to
15Out of 439,013 spells, 830 spells have only one observation. The remaining number of spells
is 438,183. The exclusion of the 830 one-observation-spells leads to 9 spells exhibiting a gap in
their time series. Since one observation per spell is lost in first-differencing within each spell, the
number of observations drops to 1,067,633.
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0.019 once the selection into the regimes is accounted for. As a result, the estimates
of the equalising effect of industry-level contracts on low-skilled workers from the
POLS specification considerably overstate the true equalising effect.
Turning to the interaction terms of the establishment effects, the estimates partly
confirm the pattern of the interacted POLS specification, with industry and firm-
level contracts decreasing the returns to establishment profitability and raising the
returns to a works council. Under firm-level contracts the positive interaction coef-
ficient on firm size from Table 3 disappears once the selectivity into the regimes is
taken into consideration. This finding provides some support of a positive selection
upon unobservables among large establishments into this contract type or, alter-
natively, of a systematic selection of individuals with high unobservable skills into
very large covered establishments. A similar result holds with respect to quasi-rents
as the interaction coefficient on quasi-rents decrease relatively less than the aver-
age wage premium, indicating a positive worker and firm selection into collective
bargaining coverage among highly profitable establishments.
The right panel of Table 5 presents the spell differenced estimates using the
eastern German sample.16 Interestingly, compared with the western German sample
the results are reversed, with firm-level contracts leading to a slightly larger wage
mark-up than in the POLS specification, which is statistically significant at the
1%-level. By contrast, the wage premium under industry-level contracts is found
to be insignificant. Thus, similar to the western German results, the differenced
specifications tend to reverse the ranking of the wage premiums obtained from the
POLS specifications. Comparing the interaction coefficients for white-collar workers
from Table 3 and 5 indicates that the flattening of the wage structure among blue
and white-collar workers that emerged from the interacted POLS specification again
arises from a selectivity bias, with white-collar workers being negatively selected
into covered firms. Further, inspection of the interaction terms on quasi-rents in
Table 3 and 5 reveals that the firm-level contract wage premium resulting from
the POLS specification appears to be upward biased especially in highly profitable
establishments. This finding is indicative of a systematic selection of individuals
with high unobservable productivity into above average profitable establishments
that are covered by a firm-level contract or, alternatively, of a positive selection upon
unobservables among highly profitable establishments into firm-level contracts.
16In the East German sample, out of 74,498 spells 165 spells exhibit only one observation per
spell. The remaining number of spells is 74,333. The exclusion of the 165 one-observation-spells
leads to 2 spells exhibiting a gap in their time series. Since one observation per spell is lost in
first-differencing within each spell, the number of observations drops to 171,057.
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4.3.3 Wage Decomposition
In this section, we use the estimates from Table 5 to decompose the wage differentials
between the three regimes into a true coverage effect and a selection effect. Consider,
for example, the wage differential between industry-level contracts and no-coverage.
From the interacted specification, the unadjusted wage gap may be written as:
lnwC − lnwN = [γC + βC · (xC − x) + δC · (uC − u) + ηC · (wC − w) + ρC · (qC − q)]
+[β · (xC − xN) + η · (wC − wN)]
+[(ϕC + ϑC)− (ϕN + ϑN)],
where variables with bars (and subscripts N and C) represent sample means of
the respective variables (under no-coverage (N) and industry-level contracts (C)).17
The first term in brackets represents the effect of industry-level contracts on wages
of individuals who are employed by covered establishments, whereas the second term
in brackets represents the part of the wage gap that may be attributed to observed
differences in time-variant individual and establishment characteristics. Finally, the
last term in brackets reflects differences due to the selection upon time-constant
observable as well as time-constant unobservable individual and establishment level
attributes. Analogous expressions may be derived for wage differentials between
firm-level contracts and no-coverage and those between industry and firm-level con-
tracts. Table 6 presents the decomposition of wage differentials between the different
regimes. For the western German sample, the figures in column (1) in the upper
panel disclose that the unadjusted wage gap under industry-level contracts relative
to uncovered firms consists of a coverage effect of 0.024 and a selection bias of 0.135.
The largest part of the selection effect can be attributed to differences in (time-
varying) establishment and individual observables. The decomposition in column
(2) suggests a much larger relative selection effect under firm-level contracts, with
the selection bias even exceeding the unadjusted wage gap. Similarly, decompos-
ing the raw wage difference between industry-level and firm-level contracts shows
that the negative wage gap mainly arises from a selection upon unobservables (and
time-constant attributes), which is found to exceed the overall coverage effect of
17For each spell s, an estimator of θs = (ϕs + ϑs) is calculated as follows:
θ̂s = lnws − γC · Cs − γF · F s − β · xs − η · ws
βC · Cs · (xs − x) + ηC · Cs · (ws − w)
βF · F s · (xs − x) + ηF · F s · (ws − w),
where variables with bars denote averages over all time-series observations within each spell.
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industry-level contracts. In other words, if workers and firms under industry con-
tracts were to exhibit the same unobservable characteristics as those under firm-level
contracts, we would observe an average unadjusted wage gap of about 0.04. Turning
to the total coverage effect, the figures disclose that the effect of industry-level con-
tracts relative to firm-level contracts and no-coverage mainly consists of an average
effect, whereas the overall effect on the returns to observable attributes appears to
be negligible. Firm-level contracts, in contrast, seem to compress the returns to
observables relative to industry-level contracts and no-coverage, though to a rather
small extent.
Table 6: Wage Decomposition
Industry-level Firm-level Industry-
Western German Sample vs. no-coverage vs. no-coverage vs. firm-level
Average effect 0.023 -.003 0.026
Effect on the returns
to observed attributes 0.001 -.013 0.015
TOTAL COVERAGE EFFECT 0.024 -.016 0.041
Differences in time-var. attributes 0.099 0.107 -.009
Differences in unobserved and
time-constant attributes 0.037 0.114 -.077
TOTAL SELECTION BIAS 0.135 0.221 -.086
Unadjusted wage gap 0.160 0.205 -.045
Industry-level Firm-level Industry-
Eastern German Sample vs. no-coverage vs. no-coverage vs. firm-level
Average effect 0.001 0.020 -.019
Effect on the returns
to observed attributes 0.001 0.001 0.001
TOTAL COVERAGE EFFECT 0.002 0.021 -.018
Differences in time-var. attributes 0.127 0.025 0.101
Differences in unobserved and
time-constant attributes 0.186 0.139 0.047
TOTAL SELECTION BIAS 0.313 0.164 0.148
Unadjusted wage gap 0.315 0.185 0.130
Source: LIAB 1995-2002. The calculations are based upon the estimates from Table 5.
The lower panel of Table 6 presents the decomposition of wages using the eastern
German sample. Similar to the western German results, differences in observables
and unobservables account for the largest proportion of the raw wage gaps under
firm and industry-level contracts relative to uncovered firms. compared with western
Germany, the selection upon unobservables and time-invariant observables appears
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to be relatively more important under both contract types. Finally, the results in
column (3) suggest that differences in observables explain the largest part of the
unadjusted wage differential between industry-level versus firm-level contracts. In
sum, the total selection bias is found to exceed the observed positive raw wage
differential. I.e., if workers and firms under industry contracts exhibited the same
observable and unobservable characteristics as those under firm-level contracts, this
would result in a negative unadjusted wage gap. Turning to the total coverage effect,
the overall effect on the returns to observable attributes is found to be negligible
under both contract types.
4.3.4 Analysing Separate Transitions
As noted earlier, in eq. (3) γC and γF are identified from variations in contract
status, i.e. if ∆Cjt 6= 0 and ∆Fjt 6= 0. Thus far, it has been assumed that the effects
of the transitions are symmetric. However, it might be possible that of those es-
tablishments who change contract status, those who become covered by a collective
contract experience a different wage effect than those who leave that collective con-
tract type. To gain an idea about the extent of such potential asymmetries, we now
separately analyse transitions from one regime to the other by estimating the spell
differenced specification for each possible transition. We then contrast the wage
growth of individuals experiencing a change in contract status to the wage growth
of two different comparison groups. The first one comprises those individuals that
stay in the origin regime, while the second one consists of those always being cov-
ered by the destination regime. To assess potential differences in outcomes, Table A3
and A4 in the appendix further present characteristics of changing establishments
compared with those in the reference groups. As set out in Section 4.1., compar-
ing those characteristics turns out to be instructive, since changes in time-specific
shocks may differ systematically across establishments that change contract status
and those that retain their contract status. As the coefficients on ∆Cjt and ∆Fjt
will be biased, if ∆Cjt and ∆Fjt are correlated with ∆εijt, this may help to explain
potential differences in estimated wage effects. Closer inspection of differences in
observable characteristics then may give us some further indication about the sever-
ity of a potential endogeneity bias as it seems reasonable to assume that differences
in unobservable factors are likely to be correlated with differences in observables.
The estimated coefficients on industry-level and firm-level contracts along with
their standard errors are presented in Table 7, which reads as follows. The first
row, for example, presents the spell differenced estimates of γC using the transitions
from firm-level to industry-level contracts. In the third column, the wage premi-
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ums are estimated by contrasting the wage gain of individuals experiencing such a
change in contract status to the wage gain of those individuals always being cov-
ered by firm-level contracts. The number in parentheses (N) refers to the number
of individuals subject to the change in contract status. In the second column, in
contrast, the wage gain is compared to the wage gain of individuals always being
covered by industry-level contracts. Consider first the upper panel of Table 7, which
presents the estimates using the western German sample. The figures in the sec-
ond row indicate that the relative wage loss of individuals that experience a change
from industry- to firm-level contracts appears to be quite uniform irrespective of the
chosen comparison group (about -0.03). By contrast, analysing the wage premium
for firm-level to industry-level contract transitions yields a somewhat different pic-
ture. Here, the point estimate obtained from the comparison with establishments
always being covered by a firm-level contract is found to be much smaller (0.006
versus 0.047). Inspection of Panels B and C in Table A3 in the appendix reveals
that this may arise from systematic differences in observables, with establishments
joining industry-level contracts being considerably smaller, less capital-intensive and
profitable than those always being covered by firm-level contracts. Thus, the ”join-
ers” of industry level contracts arguably might have experienced (more) negative
time-specific shocks, leading to a downward biased estimate of γC .
Analysing separate transitions between no-coverage and industry-level contracts
yields a rather inconsistent pattern. The figures in row (3) and (4) show that
both transitions - leaving and joining industry-level contracts - entail positive wage
effects. The result that individuals in leaving establishments experience a relative
wage gain appears to be contra-intuitive and therefore deserves somewhat closer
attention. As noted above, a possible explanation might be that establishments
in the corresponding comparison groups do systematically differ from those leaving
industry-level bargaining. Inspection of Panels A and B in Table A3 in the appendix
reveals that this appears indeed to be the case for either reference group. The most
striking difference between the reference groups and ”quitting” plants is that the
latter are considerably more capital intensive. Based on this observable difference
one might conjecture that the decision to leave industry-level contracts is driven by
factors other than wage outcomes, such as more flexibility with respect to working
time and the use of overtime hours.
Finally, consider the transitions between no-coverage and firm-level contracts.
The figures in column (3) of row (5) and (6) indicate that both transitions give
rise to negative wage effects when choosing individuals in establishments always
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being covered by firm-level contracts as the reference group. However, Panels A
and C of Table A3 in the appendix reveal that the latter appear to be an inap-
propriate comparison group given that those establishments are considerably larger,
more profitable and capital intensive than those leaving or joining firm-level con-
tracts, suggesting that these estimates might be downward biased. Based on this
evidence, the (insignificant) estimates obtained from the comparison with establish-
ment always being uncovered appear to be more reliable, since the latter do not
exhibit such striking differences in observables. However, a further concern might
be that the insignificant wage premium in row (6) is driven by a change in the sur-
vey question between 1997 and 1998, which might have induced spurious changes
from firm-level contracts to no-coverage in 1998.18 To check whether our results are
affected by this change, we re-ran the regressions after excluding all establishments
leaving firm-level contracts in 1998 from our sample (4 establishments in western
Germany and 8 establishments in eastern Germany). While the results for eastern
Germany appeared to be quite robust to this exclusion, the estimated wage effect
for the western German sample reported in column (1) and row (6) changed to
-0.058 (with a standard error of 0.035) and to -0.062 in column (3) (with a stan-
dard error of 0.037). In light of the sensitivity of the results to this exclusion and
the small number of regime switchers between firm-level contracts and no-coverage
in the western German sample, these results are therefore to be interpreted with
particular caution.
The lower panel of Table 7 presents the estimates using the eastern German
sample. While the firm-level/industry-level contract transitions yield a quite consis-
tent picture, the transitions between no-coverage and industry-level contracts show
a rather unsatisfactory pattern. The figures in row (3) and (4) indicate that workers
in establishments leaving industry-level bargaining incur a relative wage loss (corre-
sponding to a positive wage mark-up of industry-level contracts), while those joining
industry-level contracts experience a (significant) negative effect, at least compared
with those employed by establishments that are always covered by an industry-level
contract. However, inspection of Panel A and B in Table A4 shows that the lat-
ter are considerably larger, more profitable and capital-intensive than those joining
industry-level bargaining, indicating that the wage effect may be downward biased
18In 1998, the survey question concerning firm-level contracts changed from ”In this establish-
ment, is there a firm-level contract in force?” to ”... is there a firm-level contract in force that has
been concluded between this establishment and a trade union?” (author’s translation). Arguably,
this may have induced spurious changes from firm-level contracts to no-coverage in 1998 for all
those establishments incorrectly reporting the existence of a firm-level contract prior to 1998 (e.g.
those having concluded a plant-level agreement with their works council).
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Table 7: Analysis of Separate Transitions
Average wage gain (loss) compared with workers in plants that always adopt:
Western German Sample: No-coverage Industry-level Firm-level
Transition:
(1) Firm-level to industry-level (N=2,741) 0.047∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.006 (0.016)
(2) Industry-level to firm-level (N=3,854) -.033 (0.018) -.035 (0.023)
(3) No-coverage to industry-level (N=2,028) 0.017 (0.010) 0.034∗∗∗ (0.009)
(4) Industry-level to no-coverage (N=1,827) 0.046∗∗ (0.018) 0.022 (0.012)
(5) No-coverage to firm-level (N=545) -.021 (0.030) -.064∗∗∗ (0.012)
(6) Firm-level to no-coverage (N=1,303) -.001 (0.017) -.032∗∗∗ (0.015)
Average wage gain (loss) compared with workers in plants that always adopt:
Eastern German Sample: No-coverage Industry-level Firm-level
Transition:
(1) Firm-level to industry-level (N=2,197) -.064∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.002 (0.021)
(2) Industry-level to firm-level (N=2,175) 0.034∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.023∗∗∗ (0.008)
(3) No-coverage to industry-level (N=662) -.010 (0.033) -.088∗∗∗ (0.033)
(4) Industry-level to no-coverage (N=1,716) -.026∗∗ (0.012) -.083∗∗∗ (0.017)
(5) No-coverage to firm-level (N=960) 0.024∗∗ (0.010) 0.013 (0.015)
(6) Firm-level to no-coverage (N=2,983) -.012 (0.009) -.012 (0.012)
Source: LIAB 1995-2002. The estimates of the wage premiums are obtained by estimating
the interacted spell differenced specification using the respective subsamples of establishments
(those that experience the change in contract status and those that retain their contract status).
N refers to the number of individuals experiencing the transitions.
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due to a negative correlation of unobservables with contract change. The same ar-
gument holds when analysing leaving establishments (see Panel A and B in Table
A4). The estimates in row (4) show that there is indeed some evidence of a down-
ward biased estimate when comparing leaving establishments with those always
adopting industry contracts, since the implied negative wage effect is much larger
relative to a comparison with uncovered establishments (-0.083 versus -0.026). In
sum, the analysis of the separate transitions leads us to conclude that the overall
insignificant coefficient on industry contracts in Table 5 arises from a negative wage
effect for those leaving industry-level bargaining (implying a positive wage premium
of industry contracts) and a negative wage premium for those joining industry-level
contracts, with both effects approximately offsetting each other in the pooled specifi-
cation. Analysing separate transitions between no-coverage and firm-level contracts
yields a more consistent picture, with firm-level contract ”joiners” experiencing a
relative wage gain and ”leavers” suffering a relative wage loss. However, comparing
the observables of ”joiners” and uncovered establishments in Panel A of Table A4
reveals that the former are considerably more capital-intensive and profitable than
those who always stay uncovered. Based on this evidence the estimated wage pre-
mium of about 0.024 might still be upward biased, if ”joiners” of firm-level contracts
have experienced a (more) positive change in time-specific shocks.
Taken together, the estimates from Table 7 suggest a quite stable pattern with
respect to the transitions between industry-level and firm-level contracts. However,
the results also indicate that the estimated wage premiums relative to uncovered
firms need to be interpreted with some caution. This is not only because of the
small number of establishments experiencing such a change in contract status but
also because of the striking dissimilarities between regime switchers and those that
retain their contract status. For industry-level contracts, the figures indicate that
in western Germany the effect might be biased downward by the wage gain of those
establishments that leave industry-level bargaining, while in eastern Germany the
effect might be confounded by the relative wage loss experienced by those joining
industry-level contracts. A further caveat to our conclusions is that our identification
strategy cannot rule out the possibility that the small estimated wage premiums
may be an artefact of formal contract changes that are not paralleled by changes
in actual wage policies. For example, the small wage effects might be driven by
the fact that those establishments who change from no-coverage to industry-level
contracts already informally followed the terms of such contracts (or, alternatively,
that those who formally leave industry-level bargaining keep applying the contract
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terms).19 For this reason, we emphasise that our estimated wage premiums need to
be interpreted as wage mark-ups associated with a legally binding collective wage
agreement.
5 Summary and Conclusions
Using a large linked employer-employee data set, this paper has provided new evi-
dence on collective bargaining wage premiums in Germany. By using longitudinal
data, we seek to improve on recent evidence relying on cross-sectional data to identify
the collective bargaining effect. Summing up, our results indicate that in western
Germany about 70 per cent of the wage premium associated with industry con-
tracts and 65 per cent of the wage premiums associated with firm-level contracts
can be explained by differences in observables. In eastern Germany, the wage pre-
miums associated with industry and firm-level contracts drop by 60 and 70 per cent,
once differences in observables are controlled for. Overall, the results suggest that
differences in firm characteristics account for the largest proportion of omitted vari-
able bias. Systematic sorting of observably better firms into the regimes appears
to be more relevant for industry contracts in western Germany and for firm-level
contracts in eastern Germany. The estimates from a fully interacted specification
appear to support the hypothesis that unions compress some of the returns to ob-
servable worker attributes. However, the results from our differenced specifications
show that a large part of this flattening of the wage structure arises from a selec-
tivity bias, as workers with low levels of observable skills are positively and workers
with higher levels of skills are negatively selected into covered firms. In sum, our
wage decompositions indicate that the overall effect of collective bargaining cover-
age on the returns to observable attributes appears to be rather negligible once the
selection into the regimes is accounted for.
Overall, the differenced specifications suggest the following conclusions. First,
differences in observables and unobservables appear to explain the full firm-level
contract wage premium in western Germany and the full premium associated with
industry-level contracts in eastern Germany. Second, there remains a small, but
19Unfortunately, information on whether establishments without any binding collective contract
use the terms of an industry-wide agreement as a point of reference is available only from 1999
onwards in our data set. For those establishments who leave industry-level contracts this would
reduce the available waves to the period 1999 to 2001 and for those entering industry-level bargain-
ing to the period 2000 to 2001. Clearly, this restriction would lead to a substantial decrease in the
number of establishments changing contract status from which estimates of the wage premiums
could be identified.
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statistically significant wage premium of about 2 per cent for industry-level con-
tracts in western Germany and a similar premium for firm-level contracts in eastern
Germany. Overall, the results from the differenced specifications tend to reverse
the ranking of the wage premiums obtained from the POLS specifications. In fail-
ing to detect substantial wage premiums relative to uncovered firms, our findings
seem to be in line with the results reported by Hartog et al. (2002), who find
no evidence of substantial industry and firm-level contract wage premiums for the
Netherlands. The authors interpret this result as a consequence of the relatively
corporatist Dutch wage determination system. Note that a similar conclusion might
apply to Germany, where centralised unions are likely to internalise negative ex-
ternalities resulting from their wage demands. However, our analysis of separate
transitions based upon comparisons with different reference groups suggests that
the small identified wage effects should be interpreted with some caution. In partic-
ular, the results indicate that in western Germany the industry-level wage premium
relative to uncovered firms might be biased downward by the relative wage gain
of those establishments that leave industry-level bargaining, while in eastern Ger-
many the effect might be confounded by the relative wage loss experienced by those
joining industry-level contracts. Bearing these objections in mind, our analysis nev-
ertheless yields estimates that depart from those obtained using cross-sectional data,
suggesting that previous estimates might be considerably upward biased.
The result that selection into industry-level contracts appears to be somewhat
more relevant in eastern Germany might be explained by the fact that the decision of
joining or leaving an employers’ association here is to a considerably larger extent left
to the firm’s discretion than in western Germany. In other words, only those eastern
German firms that would have paid higher wages anyway are likely to adopt such
industry-level contracts. In eastern Germany, firm-level contracts then are the only
means left to unions of exerting their bargaining power and driving a wedge between
wages of comparable workers in firms adopting such a contract and those that do
not. In western Germany, in contrast, membership in an employers’ association is
likely to be more exogenous, since it presumably reflects to a larger extent the result
of a historically grown industrial relations structure.
Finally, we wish to note that there are several potential directions for future
research. First, we have focused on the impact of a change in contract status on
wages. Future research should address the question as to how other outcomes such as
employment and investment decisions are affected by collective bargaining coverage.
Second, our analysis was confined to the short-run effects of a change in contract
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status. Further investigations should go into the long-run effects in order to explore
whether there are possible dynamics in the response of wages to a change in contract
status. Ideally, this requires the availability of a considerably longer panel data set,
which would allow one to track a sufficiently large number of establishments changing
contract status over a longer time period.
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A Appendix
A.1 Construction of establishment variables:
Variable Definition
Establishment Number of employees reported for the month June averaged
size: over the present and preceding year.
Per-capita Quasi-rents are constructed by subtracting material costs and the alternative
quasi-rents: wagebill from annual sales. Per capita values are obtained by dividing
quasi-rents by establishment size. Nominal values are deflated by a sector-
specific (two-digit) producer price index. The alternative wagebill is defined
as the annual wagebill which each firm would incur if it had to pay the
average industrial wage. The average industrial wage per worker is
approximated by the weighted average of industry-specific wages for blue
and white-collar workers (separately for western and eastern Germany),
with the weights being the establishment-specific shares of those
worker groups in the total work force.
Capital-labour Constructed by using the perpetual inventory method starting from the
ratio: capital value in the first observation year and using the information on
expansion investments. The initial capital value is proxied by dividing
investment expenditures in each establishment’s first observation year
by a pre-period growth rate of investment, g, and a depreciation rate
of capital, d.*) Capital-stocks in subsequent periods are calculated by
adding real expansion investment expenditures. Nominal investment
expenditures are deflated by the producer price index of investment goods
of the Federal Statistical Office Germany. The capital-labour ratio is con-
structed by dividing the resulting capital proxy by establishment size.
Works council: Dummy=1 if works council is present. In some waves (1995 and 1997)
only those plants who enter the panel are asked to report the existence
of a works council. For the remaining establishments the missing
information is imputed based upon the information in the following year.
Firm contract: Dummy=1 if establishment is covered by a firm-specific agreement.
Industry contract: Dummy=1 if establishment is covered by an industry-specific agreement.
Note: *) To calculate the capital stock in the first period, we set d=0.1 and g=0.05
(see also Guertzgen 2005).
Table A1: Description of establishment variables
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Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev.
Transition to No-coverage Industry-level Firm-level contract
from
A. No-coverage (J=172) (J=40) (J=9)
LOG WAGE 5.03 0.25 4.93 0.33 5.12 0.20
FEMALE 0.26 — 0.24 — 0.27 —
AGE 38.22 3.50 37.43 5.44 36.73 4.66
TENURE 102.69 47.42 104.45 62.66 95.81 49.91
FOREIGN 0.07 — 0.04 — 0.06 —
WHITECOLL 0.38 — 0.34 — 0.46 —
NO DEGREE 0.17 — 0.13 — 0.14 —
VOCATIO 0.71 — 0.80 — 0.77 —
HIGHSCHOOL 4.3e−03 — 1.9e−03 — 2.9e−03 —
VOC-HIGH 0.04 — 0.01 — 0.04 —
TECHN-UNI 0.03 — 0.05 — 0.03 —
UNI 0.04 — 0.01 — 0.02 —
QUASI-RENT 0.59 0.80 0.49 0.59 0.76 0.83
SIZE 140.75 270.46 92.30 186.76 94.11 77.79
WCOUNCIL 0.29 — 0.23 — 0.44 —
K/L 1.10 2.46 0.76 0.59 0.52 0.35
B. Industry-level (J=29) (J=688) (J=15)
LOG WAGE 5.02 0.27 5.16 0.22 5.14 0.23
FEMALE 0.18 — 0.21 — 0.30 —
AGE 36.69 4.61 39.06 2.82 37.41 5.18
TENURE 96.25 47.42 127.64 48.14 97.69 68.59
FOREIGN 0.10 — 0.09 — 0.07 —
WHITECOLL 0.24 — 0.35 — 0.37 —
NO DEGREE 0.23 — 0.21 — 0.22 —
VOCATIO 0.73 — 0.69 — 0.71 —
HIGHSCHOOL 1.3e−03 — 5.55e−03 — 2.1e−03 —
VOC-HIGH 0.02 — 0.03 — 0.01 —
TECHN-UNI 0.01 — 0.04 — 0.03 —
UNI 0.01 — 0.03 — 0.03 —
QUASI-RENT 0.59 0.71 0.86 0.90 0.89 0.85
SIZE 100.08 188.36 761,85 2,269.09 421.04 386.21
WCOUNCIL 0.28 — 0.83 — 0.89 —
K/L 2.48 7.38 1.37 2.60 1.48 1.99
... to be continued on next page
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Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev.
Transition to No-coverage Industry-level Firm-level contract
from
C. Firm-level contract (J=16) (J=21) (J=58)
LOG WAGE 5.01 0.28 5.08 0.22 5.20 0.21
FEMALE 0.36 — 0.22 — 0.19 —
AGE 39.68 4.13 37.81 2.49 38.55 2.56
TENURE 86.68 43.19 107.15 60.04 120.26 55.40
FOREIGN 0.03 — 0.05 — 0.07 —
WHITECOLL 0.47 — 0.31 — 0.38 —
NO DEGREE 0.15 — 0.14 — 0.17 —
VOCATIO 0.78 — 0.81 — 0.75 —
HIGHSCHOOL 6.2e−03 — 7.3e−04 — 6.2e−03 —
VOC-HIGH 0.02 — 0.01 — 0.02 —
TECHN-UNI 0.03 — 0.02 — 0.03 —
UNI 0.02 — 0.02 — 0.03 —
QUASI-RENT 0.60 0.55 0.60 0.47 0.96 1.00
SIZE 135.98 176.32 188.77 287.27 991.91 2,257.63
WCOUNCIL 0.25 — 0.71 — 0.90 —
K/L 0.74 0.57 1.48 2.65 8.36 43.27
Table A3: Summary statistics by transitions - West
Source: LIAB 1995-2002.
Note: Per-capita quasi rents and the capital-labour ratio are measured in 100,000 DM.
1 e corresponds to 1.95583 DM. All variables are averaged over establishments.
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Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev.
Transition to No-coverage Industry-level Firm-level contract
from
A. No-coverage (J=422) (J=31) (J=24)
LOG WAGE 4.56 0.25 4.66 0.26 4.60 0.22
FEMALE 0.30 — 0.27 — 0.37 —
AGE 39.12 5.07 39.03 6.60 41.01 5.31
TENURE 61.84 24.42 70.42 24.67 66.85 24.87
FOREIGN 4.2e−03 — 0.01 — 4.7e−03 —
WHITECOLL 0.24 — 0.22 — 0.29 —
NO DEGREE 0.03 — 0.01 — 0.10 —
VOCATIO 0.87 — 0.85 — 0.81 —
HIGHSCHOOL 0.00 — 0.00 — 0.00 —
VOC-HIGH 0.03 — 0.02 — 0.02 —
TECHN-UNI 0.03 — 0.10 — 0.03 —
UNI 0.04 — 0.02 — 0.04 —
QUASI-RENT 0.32 0.59 0.34 0.50 0.58 0.96
SIZE 41.08 58.57 31.72 50.35 55.25 88.07
WCOUNCIL 0.13 — 0.13 — 0.19 —
K/L 1.41 2.80 0.48 0.42 3.76 8.24
B. Industry-level (J=46) (J=224) (J=13)
LOG WAGE 4.58 0.26 4.88 0.24 4.74 0.37
FEMALE 0.28 — 0.24 — 0.38 —
AGE 38.34 5.39 39.76 3.19 40.33 2.06
TENURE 65.04 23.80 72.25 20.27 64.69 19.71
FOREIGN 0.00 — 5.3e−03 — 0.02 —
WHITECOLL 0.28 — 0.32 — 0.43 —
NO DEGREE 0.00 — 0.05 — 0.03 —
VOCATIO 0.92 — 0.79 — 0.82 —
HIGHSCHOOL 0.00 — 1.7e−03 — 1.2e−03 —
VOC-HIGH 0.01 — 0.02 — 0.02 —
TECHN-UNI 0.04 — 0.07 — 0.06 —
UNI 0.03 — 0.07 — 0.07 —
QUASI-RENT 0.24 0.37 0.74 1.00 0.54 0.75
SIZE 65.29 114.21 257.01 384.18 231.36 282.52
WCOUNCIL 0.27 — 0.70 — 0.76 —
K/L 0.80 1.10 2.75 4.18 2.80 3.98
... to be continued on next page
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... continued
Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev.
Transition to No-coverage Industry-level Firm-level contract
from
C. Firm-level contract (J=42) (J=15) (J=44)
LOG WAGE 4.65 0.24 4.82 0.30 4.73 0.24
FEMALE 0.25 — 0.27 — 0.28 —
AGE 39.43 4.46 37.36 6.48 40.72 2.52
TENURE 59.11 23.97 56.25 22.47 60.64 16.87
FOREIGN 3.2e−03 — 0.03 — 3.1e−03 —
WHITECOLL 0.18 — 0.28 — 0.28 —
NO DEGREE 0.04 — 0.01 — 0.03 —
VOCATIO 0.89 — 0.87 — 0.83 —
HIGHSCHOOL 1.6e−03 — 0.00 — 2.8e−03 —
VOC-HIGH 0.02 — 0.02 — 0.02 —
TECHN-UNI 0.02 — 0.05 — 0.06 —
UNI 0.03 — 0.05 — 0.05 —
QUASI-RENT 0.33 0.48 0.37 0.28 0.46 0.68
SIZE 106.62 177.87 198.93 414.80 213.54 245.40
WCOUNCIL 0.42 — 0.57 — 0.73 —
K/L 1.68 4.35 1.44 2.63 1.50 3.30
Table A4: Summary statistics by transitions - East
Source: LIAB 1996-2002.
Note: Per-capita quasi rents and the capital-labour ratio are measured in 100,000 DM.
1 e corresponds to 1.95583 DM. All variables are averaged over establishments.
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